Danish Intelligence Warns Russia Could Be Ready for War in Europe Within Five Years

If the war in Ukraine ends or stalls and NATO fails to strengthen its defenses, Russia could be ready for a large-scale war in Europe within five years, according to a February 11 assessment by Denmark’s Defense Intelligence Agency (FE).

The report states that the military threat from Russia is expected to increase but notes that there is currently no immediate risk of a conventional military attack on Denmark.

According to FE, Russia has been engaged in a major restructuring and reform of its armed forces while continuing military operations in Ukraine.

Over the past year, this effort has shifted from a focus on reconstruction to an intensified military build-up aimed at enhancing its capacity for potential conflict with NATO.

The report states that Russia has already strengthened its ability to modernize military equipment and significantly increased defense production. It also notes that Russia has the capacity to allocate resources for military expansion against NATO, supported in part by external financial and material assistance.

FE projects that if the war in Ukraine ceases or is frozen, Russia could reallocate military resources, increasing its threat to NATO. Within six months, it may launch a localized conflict in a neighboring country.

In approximately two years, it could present a credible threat to one or more NATO members, potentially escalating into a regional conflict in the Baltic Sea area.

Within five years, Russia may be capable of waging a large-scale war in Europe without US involvement. These projections are based on the assumption that NATO does not strengthen its military capabilities at the same rate.

Also highlighted are the growing security tensions in the Arctic, where Russia remains the dominant military power.

Despite this, FE assesses that the threat of a conventional military attack on Greenland and the Faroe Islands differs from the threat facing Denmark.

Russia allegedly views these territories within a North American strategic context, meaning its interest in the region is primarily linked to its relationship with the United States rather than Europe. As a result, Moscow is less likely to engage militarily in these areas, as doing so would have broader strategic consequences.

The report also examines Russia’s use of hybrid warfare tactics, which include espionage, cyberattacks, shadow fleet operations, and infrastructure sabotage. FE notes that Russia is more willing to take risks in this domain, likely because it does not believe such actions would trigger NATO’s Article 5, which stipulates that an attack on one NATO member is considered an attack on all.

Russia’s use of hybrid tactics may also escalate in the Arctic, FE warns. Potential actions could include flying close to Western naval vessels, simulating attacks, or firing near Western ships and aircraft.

Such demonstrations of force could take place in areas where Russia has no legal jurisdiction under international law. If Russia increases its military presence in the Arctic, these activities are expected to continue and potentially expand.

On February 5, the Danish Maritime Authority reported Denmark is intensifying inspections of oil tankers anchored off Skagen to enforce maritime safety, environmental regulations, and seafarer protections.