Why ‘Finlandization’ Is Not About Neutrality and Why This Scenario Is Unsuitable for Ukraine

As Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy emphasizes in discussions about peace negotiations, Ukraine needs guarantees that the war will not repeat. In other words, Ukraine requires effective protection, namely NATO membership, as a way to safeguard its future.

Occasionally, suggestions of so-called Finlandization arise. This refers to Finland’s situation after World War II, where it appeared to adopt neutrality. But since countries like Switzerland, Sweden, and later Austria were also neutral, Finland’s unique story of neutrality warrants separate consideration. What does it entail?

How World War II Ended for Finland

To understand Finlandization, we must first consider the context. World War II was a challenging period for Finland. In 1939, the Soviet Union launched the Winter War by attacking Finland. A massive Soviet army of over 1 million soldiers attacked a much smaller Finnish force. Despite Finland’s brave resistance, the Soviet Union achieved its territorial objectives within four months.

This war signaled to Hitler that Stalin and the USSR were weaker than anticipated, encouraging him to plan an attack on his ally. Meanwhile, the West showed its weakness by offering minimal support to Finland.

Finland was again drawn into war from 1941 to 1944, fighting the Soviet Union. This conflict had severe consequences: after World War II, Stalin, as a victor, along with Britain and the U.S.A., played a decisive role in shaping the global order. The Soviet Union, while championing the creation of the United Nations, extended its sphere of influence across Eastern Europe, parts of Central Europe, and the Baltic states, which were fully occupied. Finland narrowly preserved its independence, but only under special conditions.

Finlandization

Current Russian President Vladimir Putin has demanded Ukraine significantly reduce its army, citing various figures but generally suggesting a force limited to tens of thousands. This idea harks back to Stalin’s policies.

• Finland’s military was capped at 34,000 soldiers.

• Its naval fleet was limited to a maximum tonnage of 10,000 tons.

• It could have no more than 60 aircraft.

Stalin demilitarized Finland and stunted its military development. Finland also had to agree to host a Soviet military base. It took decades for Finland to rearm and develop its defense industry.

For years, Finland was dependent on Moscow, forced to align nearly all its domestic and foreign policy decisions with Soviet approval. Finland joined the United Nations only in 1955, two years after Stalin's death.

The USSR also imposed heavy economic reparations on Finland, amounting to $300 million—a massive burden for a small country at the time. Meanwhile, Finland ceded territories such as Karelia, Salla, and Petsamo, losing access to the Barents Sea.

The Soviet Union exerted cultural and political influence over Finland, supporting local communists and creating committees to promote “friendship” and integration with socialist and communist practices.

Although Finland had to remain neutral, abstaining from alliances, wars, or blocs, this neutrality persisted until 2022, when Finland and Sweden jointly applied for NATO membership in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.

Finlandization and Ukraine

The context above illustrates why Finlandization is not a viable path for Ukraine. The term itself is perceived as derogatory, implying coercion into compromises that severely restrict a nation’s rights and freedoms.

Ukraine has violated no international laws, attacked no one, and even voluntarily gave up its nuclear arsenal in the early 1990s in exchange for security guarantees. Despite not being neutral, Ukraine refrained from joining NATO throughout its independence, with much of its population seeing no need for military alliances.

When NATO membership is denied to Ukraine today, citing the impracticality of integrating a divided country, Western politicians overlook historical precedents: Germany joined NATO in two stages—first West Germany, then East Germany. All that’s required is political will, which the U.S. demonstrated during those negotiations.

It is unclear why Ukraine should be pushed toward neutrality when it seeks only the means to defend itself against future Russian aggression, which has already resulted in the occupation of about 20% of its territory. Neutrality does not guarantee that Ukraine will not face further attacks. Moreover, such restrictions could slow Ukraine’s integration into the EU, leaving it within Moscow’s sphere of influence.

The historical context of World War II cannot simply be applied to events 80 years later.

Ultimately, Finland joined NATO 80 years after the war. Perhaps it is worth sparing Ukraine generations of waiting and accelerating this process now?