How Ukraine Defends Against Russia’s Invisible Onslaught of Electronic Warfare

On March 15, 2025 Ukraine’s Special Operations Forces (SOF) confirmed via Telegram that they had successfully destroyed a Russian “Utyos-TM” radar system, significantly weakening Moscow’s air-defense capabilities.

“This radar was actively tracking Ukrainian aircraft, missiles, and drones within a 360-km radius in real time,” SOF reported. “Its destruction has significantly weakened Russian control over the skies and reduced the effectiveness of their air defense systems,” Ukrainian forces added. 

This attack is one of many on Russian radar systems as part of Ukraine’s electronic warfare (EW) defense strategy. In addition to traditional battlefield domains of land, sea, air, and space, EW is becoming increasingly important. EW is an invisible yet pivotal aspect of Russia’s war in Ukraine.

Russia’s EW (called “radioelektronnaya bor’ba (REB)” in Russian) capability has formed into a key part of its armed forces. Thus, eliminating its EW technology has also become vital to  Ukraine’s defense efforts.

Russia was once thought to dominate the electronic warfare space, now, Ukraine has emerged as a world leader, with its defense industries developing increasingly advanced systems for its military. Outpacing Russia’s development, Ukraine is deploying advanced systems quickly to its frontlines. 

What is electronic warfare?

NATO defines electronic warfare (EW) as a “military action that exploits electromagnetic energy to provide situational awareness and create offensive and defensive effects.”

EW differs from cyber warfare. NATO’s policy explains that “broadly speaking, cyber operations use various hacking techniques to infiltrate and disrupt a target’s computer systems,” and EW “uses directed energy to cut off access to the electromagnetic spectrum” for electronic attack (EA), electronic support (ES), and electronic protection (EP) measures. 

EW aims to reduce the effectiveness of enemy forces and weapon systems. It targets communications and reconnaissance by changing the speed and quality of information processes. In defense, EW works to protect military assets. EW radio signals, infrared, and radar can detect, protect, and communicate, while EW also disrupts, jams, and disables counterparts' ability to use these signals. 

The electromagnetic space is complicated. Different types of signals are broadcast across the electromagnetic spectrum, from cellular signals and radar to GPS and GLONASS . Cruise missiles, soldiers, unmanned aerial vehicles, fighter jets, and more all send and receive a variety of different signals.

Ukraine’s Armed Forces successfully targeted and disabled a Russian Kasta radar station worth $60 million with a high-precision strike, as was reported on March 6, 2025. The Kasta 35N6 is a mobile, two-coordinate radar system designed for airspace monitoring, target detection, and aircraft identification.

Eliminating Russia’s military assets, such as radars, removes its ability to support their weapon systems in their attack efforts against Ukraine. 

What EW systems does Russia have?

There are a variety of EW systems that work to either support EA and ES in reconnaissance, guidance, etc, or EP efforts–working to disrupt, spoof, and jam Ukraine’s military assets. Russia has a long list of radar systems, but some of its most prized systems include the 96L6E, Kasta 35N6, 9S36, and many more. EW systems all have their roles to play, from guiding missiles to their target, to detection of aerial weaponry. 

Deception and jamming are key aspects of Russia’s attack strategies, the following systems are used extensively by Russia on the frontlines in a bid to curtail and hinder Ukraine’s defense operations.

• Leer 3: Reconnaissance, control, deception, and information operations, working together with the Olran 10 UAV against Ukrainian military cell phones, radar systems, GPS at a range of up to 140km

• Mercury-B: Decepts artillery shells and radio systems at a range of 400m 

• Krasukha-2: Prevents aircraft from communicating and can disable Airborne Warning and Control Systems (ACWS), as well as radar-guided missiles.

• Krasukha-4: Extensively deployed in Ukraine, disrupts, conducts reconnaissance and SIGNIT  targeting radar systems and satellite communication up to 300km away.

• Mosvka-1: Reconnaissance and SIGINT against drones and airspace systems up to 400km away.

• Murmansk-BN: Specializes in jamming short-wave radio communications, boasting a remarkable operational range that could disable NATO aerospace and radar complexes.

• Saphir: Countering unmanned vehicles through automatic classification and suppression

• Anti-drone technologies: Such as the Harpoon-3 and Silok protect against UAV attacks

• Zhittel: A mobile truck-mounted electronic warfare jamming communication station

EW attacks come in different forms. During the first months of Moscow’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, Russian forces sent propaganda and fake orders to troops and civilians using their Leer-3 system by hijacking the local cellular network, according to reports.

How does a Russian EW operation work?

All systems have a different role in one operation, often working simultaneously. Austrian Cyber-specialist Major Markus Schmid, in an online video, explains how Russia attempts to disrupt and confuse Ukrainian forces via EW methods in a single-operation strategy using the systems listed above. 

The Leer-3 platform would send text messages and fake calls to Ukrainian cell phone users in the area with a Ukrainian number, confusing and deceiving Ukrainian forces.

At the same time, when detecting a firing artillery battery the Mercury-B system would confuse it, using its ground proximity sensor of the artillery shell to trigger the grenade. 

Zhittel would work in reconnaissance, finding Ukrainian drone swarms in the area. Saphir would then target radios and the UAVs, jamming and suppressing them. 

Moskva’s would work to detect aircraft and drone swarms. The Krashuka-4 system prevents aircraft from communicating, disabling their radar systems, and precise spot jamming is carried out. 

The Krashuka-2 would then prevent the aircraft from communicating, disabling its Airborne Warning and Control System (ACWS), as well as its radar-guided missiles.

Finally, the Murmansk systems clear up the short and medium-wave radio equipment, RECCE  them, and jam them if necessary. 

What electronic warfare systems does Ukraine have?

Ukrainian electronic warfare company Kvertus creates and develops solutions to protect critical facilities using signal intelligence and electronic warfare systems. They have produced over 30 EW tools and systems, from car installations and and anti-drone guns to EW jamming systems that can be worn as backpacks. 

Kvertus is one of many, as Ukraine now has more than 50 companies specializing in EW manufacturing and development and more than 100 EW projects registered with Brave1  alone. The following are just a few of the vast EW systems that Ukraine currently uses.

• Bukovel-AD: Anti-drone detection of up to 1000km, also blocking data transmission, control, and navigation signals using GPS, GLONASS, Galileo, and BeiDou positioning systems at 15-20 kilometers. It fits on the back of a pickup truck.

• Eter: The size of a suitcase, it can detect jamming signals from Russian EW systems—allowing Ukraine to target them with artillery. 

• Pokrova: Consisting of a network of antennas, it disrupts satellite navigation coordinates, guiding Russian missiles into predefined zones for interception.

• Shatro: Anti-drone system protect frontline units, command posts, trenches, and other strategic assets from Russian attack drones.

• Enclave: Creates interference for receivers operating on the frequencies of the GLONASS and GPS navigation systems up to 40km away

• Note: Developed in parallel with the Bukovel and Enclave, Note is capable of suppressing cellular communication networks and can also counteract EW tools and counter-battery radars.

• Hecate: Detects and classifies the signals of radars, types of radio-electronic warfare, air defense, and aviation. Hecate can move quickly and tracks objects at distances of up to 450 km

How Ukraine combats Russia’s electronic warfare efforts

Despite Russia’s efforts, throughout Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine’s EW forces have successfully targeted Russia’s EW vulnerabilities. 

In March 2022, RUSI  reported that Russian forces had poor radio communications, “leading to makeshift solutions”. They began using mobile phones and unencrypted civilian radio for communications. Ukrainian EW forces were able to eavesdrop on Russia’s transmissions.

Ukraine has adapted to Russia's jamming using other guidance mechanics, locating and destroying Russian EW sites such as radar systems, and using alternative systems that don’t depend on GPS. This month alone there have been several reports of Russia’s EW systems being destroyed.

Destruction of Russian radar systems

Ukraine’s 15th Separate Artillery Reconnaissance Brigade "Black Forest", successfully struck and destroyed a $40 million Russian 9S36 radar station, sharing the video on Facebook on March 12, 2025. The radar is vital to Russia’s BUK-M2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, guiding its missiles to their targets. 

A high-value Russian 96L6E surveillance radar caught fire in Crimea, on March 4, 2025. The 96L6E radar is critical to the operation of S-300 and S-400 air defense systems and an essential part of Russia’s S-400 air defense system, responsible for detecting high-altitude and medium-altitude aerial targets.

This year, in February 2025, a new EW solution for Ukrainian troops was revealed Defense Express  reported. The Arhont is already used to track down Russian radars and other targets and its newest variant is set to further support Ukrainian troops. The Arhont detects, analyzes, identifies, and classifies the electromagnetic radiation of Russian equipment. Combined with other stations in a single system, it can determine the exact location of aircraft, helicopters, drones, maritime radars, air defense systems, electronic warfare equipment, and more.

It passively listens to the radio wave frequencies in the area, without emitting its own signals, making it undetectable to Russia’s electronic intelligence (ELINT ). “In October 2024, the system was utilized to detect Russian air defense assets, and not just the powerful radars of S-300/S-400 missile systems but also less conspicuous radiation from Tor short-range SAM systems, and a number of ground-based threats and aircraft”, Defense Express reported.

Drone jamming and spoofing

Ukrainian forces have successfully employed EW to disrupt Russian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) hindering Russian operational capabilities, providing them with critical intelligence and situational awareness of Russian forces. 

Following Ukraine’s EW success in jamming Russia’s FPV  drones during the Kursk incursion, Russia introduced fiber-optic-controlled drones that are immune to jamming. Unlike traditional drones, these UAVs transmit video via a fiber-optic cable, avoiding radio interference. However, Ukraine has developed an advanced drone detection technology, capable of identifying fiber-optic-controlled FPV drones.

The newly developed mobile radar station enables the detection of drones at distances of several kilometers, providing early warning and response capabilities. 

Ukraine has also successfully intercepted and altered the satellite coordinates of Russian Shahed strike drones, redirecting them back into Russian and Belarusian territory. On November 26, 2024, 95 drones were diverted using spoofing tactics, manipulating the satellite coordinates and guiding the drones and missiles through Ukrainian airspace.

Ukraine rapidly developing its EW battlefield

The UK government highlighted in its “Space, Cyber and the Electromagnetic Environment” report, that Ukraine offers a unique case study for understanding the role of EW in war. Ukraine has shown rapid technological innovation and adaptation, which has been essential to stay ahead of Russia’s attacking forces. 

In 2024, Ukraine decided to scale up the production of domestically produced EW systems, General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported. In order to support new technologies reaching the battlefield at exceptional speed, the Armed Forces of Ukraine established special units to support the development and testing of new EW systems.

As part of this program, the “Iron Range” was launched, a space for Ukrainian producers and defense contractors to test their new EW systems, along with other military equipment. 

"This project is an important step in developing the Ukrainian defense industry. It will enable weapons and equipment manufacturers to significantly shorten the time needed to test and bring their products up to the standards required for real combat operations. It is a strategic approach to providing the Armed Forces with the weapons they need immediately and at this moment, not potentially in the future”, Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine Ivan Havryliuk said. 

“Ukraine’s success in this is not just about resilience or patriotism but about the ability to adapt, decentralize and leverage new technologies faster than its opponent” Chatham House  Deputy Director of the International Security Programme Joyce Hakmeh said. “Technology alone does not win wars; the ability to innovate quickly, integrate private-sector expertise and field solutions at scale is what shifts the balance of power. Ukraine offers a lesson in adaptation, one that Europe cannot afford to ignore.”