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Jet-Powered Geran-5 and Shaheds Mark a New Phase of Russia’s Air Terror

The evolution of aerial threats is moving beyond simple loitering munitions toward high-speed jet drones and complex satellite-integrated platforms.
This shift is transforming electronic warfare (EW) from basic GPS jamming into a multi-layered system that combines digital identification, physical interception, and behavioral analysis, according to Army Inform on February 19.
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Timofiy Yurkov, an EW expert and industry co-founder, explains that speed is not a hurdle for electronic defense. Since radio waves travel at the speed of light, they can instantly “cover” a target regardless of whether it flies at 100 km/h or 500 km/h.
While high speed challenges physical interceptors like anti-aircraft guns, EW creates a zone where a drone’s internal electronics simply cannot decode essential navigation signals.
One of the most significant modern challenges is “mesh-networking,” where drones communicate with each other in a web-like structure. Disrupting this network is vital because it prevents drones from sharing data or being manually redirected by an operator toward civilian targets. Breaking this link isolates each unit, making mass attacks far less effective.

Despite the rise of “machine vision” and inertial navigation, Yurkov emphasizes that jamming remains critical. Inertial systems suffer from “accumulating error"—small deviations caused by wind or turbulence that, without a satellite signal, cause a drone to miss its target by kilometers.
If a drone is jammed early enough, its intended target effectively “shifts” into an empty field or non-residential zone.
Modern EW now uses “digital signatures” to identify specific drone models within milliseconds. This allows for personalized jamming that targets the exact frequencies of a specific threat, making the defense more efficient.
While futuristic concepts like Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) weapons exist, they remain too expensive and risky for use near populated areas because they would destroy all surrounding electronics.

“On my view, we have two key challenges. The first is a lack of unified coordination. The second is an insufficient number of the systems themselves.
If we talk about an ideal model for protecting cities, settlements, and critical infrastructure, then EW should be placed literally everywhere: on buildings, high-rises, key objects, and communication base stations.
If all these elements are also combined into a single management system, efficiency will increase many times over compared to what we have now. However, such a model requires colossal resources. EW systems and their components are expensive, and this is where we run into funding.

This is visible even at the tactical level. The general level of provision, including personal, vehicle-mounted, long-range, and zonal cover EW systems, currently stands at approximately 40–45%. This is not enough,” said Timofiy Yurkov, electronic warfare expert and co-founder of a Ukrainian EW and anti-drone systems manufacturing company.
Earlier, a report revealed that Russia’s Geran-2 drones were built almost entirely with foreign parts from the US, China, and Europe. Despite sanctions, hundreds of components like microchips and fuel pumps were shipped through intermediaries in Hong Kong and China.
Experts suggested these parts were likely smuggled, resold from old inventory, or stripped from civilian electronics.
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