The Chemical Trail Behind Russia’s Infamous Kalibr Missiles Leads Back to Europe

Despite sanctions, Russian missile production remains dependent on imported chemical raw materials, as domestic substitutes are unavailable. Documents reviewed by the StateWatch think tank indicate that cellulose acetate manufactured by the European company Cerdia was purchased, through intermediaries in the tobacco business, by a Russian plant involved in the production of missile systems.

Russia’s Kalibr production

One of Russia’s key missile manufacturers is OKB Novator JSC, part of the Almaz-Antey concern, which produces cruise missiles, including the 3M-54 Kalibr.

Kalibr cruise missiles, which Russia regularly launches from ships and submarines in the Black Sea, have become one of the main tools used in strikes against Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure.

Russia’s Perm Powder Plant, which supplies rocket fuel, plays an important role in the Kalibr's production chain. In a letter from Novator to the Perm Powder Plant concerning fulfillment of a state defense order for the supply of these missiles, the company states that it is necessary to use foreign-made products because Russian equivalents do not exist, including cellulose acetate.

Cellulose acetate is a highly purified cellulose derivative produced through complex chemical processes and specialized raw materials. Russia does not have a large-scale production of this kind of product at the required quality level, forcing enterprises to rely on imports.

Although cellulose acetate is widely used in the cigarette industry, it belongs to a broader class of cellulose-based materials that are critical to the production of propellants and rocket fuel.

Cellulose derivatives are used in the production of a wide range of Russian weapons, from KAB-500 and KAB-1500 guided aerial bombs to S-300, Buk, and Tochka-U missile systems, as well as Yars strategic missile systems and Kornet anti-tank missiles, according to the documents.

From European factories to Russian missile plants

Materials purchased from European manufacturers ultimately reached the Perm Powder Plant and were integrated into the production of missile systems, show the documents in StateWatch’s possession.

Cellulose acetate appears in both customs data and internal corporate contracts. In particular, at least 30 tons of the substance were purchased from the European manufacturer Cerdia.

Cerdia is one of the world’s leading manufacturers of cellulose acetate for cigarette filters, with facilities in Europe, the United States, and Asia. The company’s website still contains a reference to its presence in Russia.

A letter from Cerdia regarding the supply of cellulose acetate flakes, a basic raw material for further processing, was found in the Perm Powder Plant’s records.

According to its official operational program, the Perm Powder Plant has a full technological cycle for producing rocket fuel. However, documents indicate that the enterprise remains dependent on imported chemicals. In particular, this concerns cellulose derivatives purchased from Cerdia because there are no Russian equivalents.

Intermediaries that channel the imports

Internal corporate documents point to the key role of intermediaries in these supplies. In particular,  A2 Group LLC appears in contracts as the supplier of foreign products to the Perm Powder Plant.

In the minutes of a meeting of the Perm Powder Plant’s procurement commission dated March 14, 2025, the purchase of Rhodia Acetow (Cerdia) cellulose acetate of French origin is explicitly stated. The document defines the subject of the contract as the supply of this product, with a maximum contract value of €840,000 ($975,000) and a completion deadline by the end of 2025.

The same minutes record the decision to make the purchase from a sole supplier, A2 Group, selected following a market analysis.

The document directly confirms that foreign-made Cerdia products are being procured for a Russian defense industry enterprise through an intermediary as part of a formalized procurement procedure.

A2 Group does not appear to be a specialized supplier of chemical products. In open sources, the company presents itself as a supplier of electrical equipment. Despite this, it is through this company that European-made cellulose acetate is purchased for the Perm Powder Plant.

In customs data, A2 Group does not appear as the importer. Instead, cellulose acetate is imported by other companies, including those linked to the tobacco industry, the key civilian consumer of this product. These entities appear in the supply chain leading to the Perm Powder Plant, pointing to a multilevel scheme in which importation, intermediary activity, and end use are divided among different legal entities.

Tobacco companies as gateways

Customs databases show that from the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion against Ukraine through March 2025, at least $7.3 million worth of products from Cerdia’s German division were imported into Russia. The main recipients were two Russian companies: Gulbahar Rus LLC and Sertov LLC.

Gulbahar Rus received more than $5.7 million worth of Cerdia products. The company operates in the tobacco segment, which is the main civilian market for cellulose acetate, thereby demonstrating the commercial channel through which this product enters Russia.

Sertov appears to be the key link between civilian imports and enterprises in Russia’s defense-industrial complex. The company received at least $1.6 million worth of Cerdia products and, at the same time, has confirmed ties to Russian defense industry enterprises.

Specifically, in 2016, Sertov concluded three contracts with the Perm Powder Plant worth nearly 11 million rubles, and from 2016 to 2018, it supplied cellulose acetate to the Scientific Research Institute of Polymer Materials (NIIPM JSC), engaged in the development of munitions and rocket fuel, and located at the same address as the Perm plant.

Thus, customs and contract data together point to a multilevel supply structure: foreign products enter Russia through civilian-profile companies and are then integrated, via intermediaries, into the production processes of defense-industrial enterprises.

Dual-use goods and sanctions loopholes

Despite sanctions, supplies of foreign-made products continue through a network of intermediaries and civilian-profile companies, allowing them to be integrated into the production of missile weapons. This supply structure not only makes supply chains harder to trace but also effectively ensures the uninterrupted production of weapons used in the war against Ukraine.

Oleksandr Frolov, a partner in the dispute resolution practice at the international law firm Kinstellar, notes that the EU has an export control system for military and dual-use goods designed to restrict their entry into Russia. If a company knew or should have known about the possible military use of its products, or failed to ensure proper control over end use, this may indicate circumvention of export restrictions and could entail liability.

“According to international practice, sanctions may be imposed not only on defense-industrial enterprises, but also on manufacturers of dual-use goods if their products are used in weapons production,” says Frolov. “This category includes companies whose goods may contribute to the conduct of war. In particular, restrictions may be imposed on the export and import of dual-use products.”

StateWatch sent an official inquiry to Cerdia asking it to explain possible supplies of cellulose acetate to Russia after 2022, as well as its ties to intermediary companies and its control over the end use of its products. As of the time of publication, the company had not responded to these questions.

This material was prepared as part of the cooperation between the StateWatch think tank and UNITED24 Media.

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