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Opinion

Lessons of the Budapest Memorandum: the Real Price of Deals at Ukraine’s Expense

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Andrii Sybiha

After the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, Ukraine inherited the third-largest nuclear arsenal in the world. As the newly independent nation navigated its path, the question of what to do with this nuclear potential became a central issue. Both the United States and Russia played key roles in pressuring Ukraine to give up its nukes.

Authors
Andrii Sybiha, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine

In 1992, Ukraine began negotiations with the United States and Russia to relinquish its nuclear arsenal in exchange for security guarantees.

At the time, the question of retaining nuclear weapons in the newly independent states of the former USSR was one of the most pressing concerns in reshaping international relations after the Cold War. Western nations feared the spread and potential loss of control over the nuclear arsenals left behind by the Soviet Union.

The Budapest Memorandum, signed on December 5, 1994, marked the conclusion of extensive international negotiations about the Soviet nuclear weapons still stationed in Ukraine.  On December 5, 1994, the document was signed by Presidents Leonid Kuchma, Boris Yeltsin, Bill Clinton, and British Prime Minister John Major. 

This document committed the signatory nations to respect Ukraine's independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. It also pledged to refrain from using force, threatening force, or applying economic pressure. In the event of any threat to Ukraine involving nuclear weapons, the signatories agreed to hold consultations in the UN Security Council.

Ukraine undertook at least 6 attempts to convene consultations under the memorandum. Even before Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukraine had been trying to activate the Budapest Memorandum. But this document failed to fulfill its key goal of ensuring security for Ukraine.

This week, on December 5th, we marked the 30th anniversary of this document, or rather, this piece of paper. I brought it with me to the NATO headquarters. This is probably the only function it can still serve now. To be a grim reminder of how not to resolve strategic security issues.

Many mistakes have been made in the decades since its signing. One of them was the absence of strong decisions on Ukraine’s NATO membership in 2008. 

During my visit to Brussels this week, one of my colleagues recalled what was happening behind the scenes in 2008. Putin was warning key NATO leaders not to provide Ukraine and Georgia with membership action plans. Otherwise, he threatened, he would invade our countries. 

They chose appeasement and weakness. But Russia still invaded both Georgia and Ukraine. 

How many more shortsighted mistakes need to happen so that everyone finally learns that Russia respects only the language of strength? 

Thirty years later, Russia acts and ruins security in Europe and globally. Russia continues its war crimes, strikes on the Ukrainian energy system, and attempts to deprive people of power and heating amid freezing temperatures. Moscow failed to achieve strategic goals in Ukraine. But it is consolidating a new axis of terror with Iran and North Korea.

The main lesson of the Budapest Memorandum failure is this: long-term security solutions must include a strong Ukraine as part of the Euro-Atlantic community. Striking deals behind Ukraine’s back or at Ukraine’s expense is a sure path to security disaster.

Ukraine has concluded 27 security agreements with its partners over the past two years. They provide much-needed strengthening for our country on its path to the only effective long-term security guarantee: full-fledged NATO membership.

There have been many discussions on this issue. Dozens of arguments for and against. Each NATO summit is a drama of debating relevant wording. Open doors, irreversible paths, bridges — we have heard many words in the past years. However, now is the time to set aside heated debates about wording and address the reality.

And the real, serious question everyone needs to ask themselves is how we are going to ensure the security of Europe. If we look at the map of Europe and the numbers of combat-ready units, shells in stock, and the capacity of defense industries, we will realise that it is impossible to ensure the security of Europe without Ukraine. We are the main military muscle of the continent. 

The Alliance should rethink its collective defense strategy and move from reactive and delayed policies to proactive and decisive steps aimed at achieving peace through strength.

The concept of “peace through strength” is reflected in the Peace Formula and the Victory Plan proposed by Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy.

Peace through strength means taking the necessary steps to make our enemies fear us, showing them that we have both the ability and the resolve to inflict serious harm on them. And by this very demonstration avoid the need to actually use the strength.

In the case of Russian aggression, the realization of this concept requires strengthening Ukraine both militarily and diplomatically. We need to generate the will to end the war on the Russian side through superior firepower on the Ukrainian side.

Achieving peace through strength includes respect for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; adherence to the principle of “nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine”, geopolitical certainty on Ukraine’s EU and NATO membership; and lifting all restrictions on weapon supplies and their use against Russian military targets.

The security of Ukraine and the Euro Atlantic is indivisible. Ukraine in the EU and NATO as a key component of the “peace through strength” concept is the only way to guarantee long-term stability in Europe.

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