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The Western-Made Electronics Powering Russia’s Deadly Glide Bombs Through Shell Companies

The Western-Made Electronics Powering Russia’s Deadly Glide Bombs Through Shell Companies

Sanctions were meant to choke Russia’s war machine—but Western microchips are still guiding its bombs. Despite sweeping restrictions, Russia keeps finding ways to import foreign technology critical to producing one of its most lethal weapons: glide bombs (KABs).

3 min read
Authors
Viktoria Vyshnivska
Viktoria Vyshnivska
Senior Researcher at the Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO)

Ukraine’s Independent Anti-Corruption Commission (NAKO) investigated the import of parts for the UMPK—a universal planning and correction module—that enables Russian-guided aerial bombs to hit their targets. This module is what makes glide bombs one of the most dangerous types of Russian weapons. Without components from Ukraine’s allied countries, their production would be impossible.

Although completely blocking the export of components to Russia is extremely difficult, several steps could significantly complicate further weapons production.

Russia launched 10,000 KABs at Ukraine in 2023. This number quadrupled in 2014. Russia is increasingly using these guided bombs, which have become a deadly threat to Ukrainian cities and military positions. Thanks to these munitions, Russian forces captured Avdiivka and continue to attack Ukrainian troops along the front line, particularly in the Donetsk and Kharkiv regions.

What are guided aerial bombs (KABs) and why are they a problem?

KABs are mostly upgraded Soviet-era bombs weighing 500 to 3,000 kg, equipped with the UMPK (munition guidance module). This module consists of bomb wings, which extend the bomb’s range, and a GPS navigation system, which is responsible for its accuracy. Guided bombs are difficult to shoot down because they are launched from beyond the range of Ukraine’s air defense systems. Meanwhile, Ukraine has limited capabilities to counter them.

In its new report, The Makers of Ruin: Glide Bombs, UMPK, and Their Civilian Cost, NAKO examined UMPK debris. Researchers found that 71% of the microelectronics in the UMPK come from manufacturers targeting Western markets. Of the 22 identified producers, 10 are based in the United States, six in China, four in Switzerland, and two each in Ireland and Japan.

How did NAKO trace the origin of these components?

NAKO analyzed a customs dataset containing over 600,000 records of shipments of electronic components that could be used in the production of UMPKs in Russia. In the research, analysts identify the approximate value of shipments of these components, as well as the companies (both private and state-owned) involved in these import transactions.

While analyzing microelectronics shipments to Russia, NAKO identified more than a thousand major Russian importers, 97% of which are private companies. Many of these importers have no formal connection to microelectronics or the defense industry. Some are officially involved in mattresses, poultry farming, or frozen food resales. The presence of such importers is often a red flag, suggesting that the end users of microelectronics might be fictitious.

NAKO also identified 26 factories involved in manufacturing various parts of guided bombs. Given Russia’s ongoing upgrades and increased production, this number is likely growing. A major problem is that international sanctions targeting these factories vary widely. For example, while Ukraine has sanctioned 85% of these producers, the US has sanctioned 73%, the EU and Switzerland just over half, and the UK only 4%. Moreover, these sanctions don’t always target the same entities—different jurisdictions impose restrictions inconsistently, leaving significant gaps in the global sanctions regime.

What needs to be done?

  1. Strengthen export controls. Ukraine’s partners must tighten control over technologies that could be used to produce weapons for Russia.

  2. Engage with manufacturers. Major tech companies must intensify supply chain monitoring and implement product-tracking mechanisms to prevent their components from ending up in the hands of the Russians.

  3. Continue investigations. Civil society and expert organizations must keep exposing sanctions evasion schemes to prevent Russia’s military-industrial complex from growing stronger.

Still, it’s important to have no illusions—completely cutting Russia off from Western microelectronics is extremely difficult. However, we must make the process of acquiring these components costlier, slower, and more complicated.

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