Can Fiber-Optic Drones Be Stopped? How Ukraine Faces the Unjammable Threat

We spoke with Ukrainian servicemen about their experiences encountering these UAVs and how their units have adapted to this technology. But first, what are these drones?

What are fiber-optic drones?

Fiber-optic drones are typically FPV loitering munition UAVs connected to their operator by an ultra-thin fiber-optic cable, rather than a radio wave, making them invulnerable to electronic warfare (EW) systems.

Although sporadic use of these UAVs was recorded at the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the active use began in 2024. A fiber-optic FPV drone, Prince Vandal of Novgorod (KVN), was spotted in August 2024 being used by the Russian army in Russia’s Kursk region during Ukraine’s incursion.

Shortly after, in November 2024, the serial production of the fiber-optic KVN drone in Russia was announced by Aleksey Chadaev, the general director of the research and production center Ushkuynyk, who stated that the device was used in all directions during the “special military operation,” a term used by the Russian government to describe its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which began in February 2022.

That November, Ukrainian company 3DTech was preparing to supply the Ukrainian military with the first batch of fiber-optic FPV drones under the name Khyzhak REBOFF, founder of the company, Oleksii Zhulinskii, told Forbes.

More than 30 companies in Ukraine were reportedly manufacturing drones that use fiber-optic communication for control and video transmission as of July of this year, Ukraine’s Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov said on Telegram.

Advantages

Fiber-optic drones have obvious advantages, along with more covert ones.

• Immunity to EW and signal-interception systems.

• Improved data transmission speed and image quality, thanks to the speed of light in fiber optics.

• Ability to deploy drones into enclosed spaces and tunnels.

• Ability to successfully navigate terrain obstacles and maintain flight altitudes of 20–50 meters above the ground, making detection much more difficult.

Limitations

• The range of drones is limited, depending on the length of the cable used. As of now, drones with ranges of 5, 10, 20, and up to 40–50 kilometers have been recorded.

• The increased weight of the FPV drone. The longer the cable, the bigger the reel, and the heavier the weight, which in turn forces to reduction of the weight of the warhead.

• Sensitivity to extreme weather conditions.

• Risk of physically damaging the cable during flight.

• More difficult to operate and lower speed compared to usual FPVs.

Fiber-optic drones on today’s battlefield

Currently, about 20-30% of the drones used by Russian forces are fiber-optic drones. This is the situation for the 1st Battalion PASKUDA GROUP of the 21st Separate Regiment of Unmanned Systems, said the Platoon Commander Bandyt, who is working in the Kharkiv direction as of October.

“In the area where our unit operates, covering several settlements, the enemy uses fiber-optic drones for about 20–30% of their sorties,” he says. “The majority are still analog drones. For other units situation differs, with fiber-optic drones making up more than 50% of their operations.”

Bandyt notes that Russia still has the upper hand when it comes to fiber-optic drones: “Sadly, they [Russian forces] hold a pronounced advantage in quality because their military‑industrial complex produces them. Our efforts are driven more by individuals and volunteers building these systems themselves rather than by an industrial program, so the quality of our fiber‑optic drones is noticeably lower. We’re playing catch‑up, striving to keep pace with the enemy’s developments, procurements, and improvements.”

Current countermeasures mostly consist of concealment, physical barriers, such as various anti-drone nets to protect the dugouts, pump-action weapons, and changing logistical routes and checking them beforehand, says Bandyt.

“I haven’t personally seen this in action, but guys from the Sumy direction told me about teams that install barriers made of tungsten threads that heat up under voltage,” he says. “When a fiber-optic cable touches these wires, the fiber breaks, the enemy drone loses control, and it falls—sometimes exploding. I understand that this method works in practice, but I haven’t witnessed it myself while on duty.”

A video of this handmade technology can be found on the internet, although it’s clear that such a device is still in its early stages and has not been widely adopted or standardized by the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Iryna Rybakova, Head of Communications of the 93rd Brigade “Kholodnyi Yar,” currently serving in the Kostiantynivka direction, admits that it’s difficult for her unit to pronounce the exact percentage used by the Russian forces against them, but she estimates half or slightly less than that.

“We often find reels of fiber‑optic cable near damaged vehicles, including armored vehicles equipped with EW systems,” Rybakova told UNITED24 Media. “Previously, fiber‑optic systems were used closer to the front line, for example, around Kostiantynivka railway station. Longer‑range missions, toward Oleksiievo‑Druzhkivka, for example, relied on drones that use radio frequencies. That has changed: fiber‑optic drones now reach as far as Kramatorsk.”

The first instance of Russian fiber-optic drones striking a car in the center of Kramatorsk was recorded on October 5.

Rybakova agrees with Bandyt, saying that Russians have far more drones of various types than Ukrainians do. She says a new tactic used by Russians involves “waiting” for drones that land on a road and wait for a vehicle to pass before taking off.

Is countering fiber-optic drones possible?

Rybakova shares what her unit does in order to combat fiber optics.

Nets

Nets everywhere. All positions, “from infantry to artillery,” are draped with nets. Nets are also set up over roads. Although Rybakova noted, they’re not a panacea: “They burn and melt. ‘Waiting’ drones can also hide under the nets.”

Vehicles also get fitted with anti‑drone nets, which can cause a drone to detonate prematurely, exploding at a distance, leaving a chance for people to stay alive.

Logistics

“As for logistics, on the contrary, it has moved from nighttime and dusk into daytime,” Rybakova said. “Drones with thermal imaging still exist, and spotting and striking such a drone at night is harder, so now our soldiers travel more during the day.”

Another tactic used by the unit is to avoid using vehicles altogether, instead moving on foot: “Enemy drone operators are currently more focused on targeting vehicles. They notice lone pedestrians far less often,” Iryna noted. “Moving on foot into places like Pokrovsk or Kostiantynivka has become normal for many soldiers.”

Additional shooter groups

Rybakova said that her unit usually deploys two shotgun‑armed shooters in a pickup heading to a position—one watching ahead and the other covering the rear.

The unit also uses mobile shooter teams that patrol Russian drone routes and attempt to shoot them down. That tactic is effective: when Russian drone operators spot these teams, they tend to avoid those areas and fly elsewhere.

Net-guns

Regarding net‑guns, Rybakova said that soldiers do carry them, though they are not so common: “They’re called a ‘last‑resort’ weapon for when a drone is already very close. Fortunately, I haven’t had to use one myself.”

Modern drone warfare is actively developing on the Ukrainian battlefield, but it seems too early to speak of any global innovations in countering fiber-optic drones. One thing is clear: this war is progressing at a rapid pace, forcing soldiers to continuously adapt to ever-evolving technologies.

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