How Banned Japanese CNC Machine Tools Secretly Flow Into Russia’s War Machine

The Russian military industry is critically dependent on CNC (computer numerical control) machines. CNC machines allow for the rapid production of the necessary high-precision components made of metal and other hard materials, which are required for the production of the vast majority of defense products. Earlier, UNITED24 Media identified dozens of CNC machines at Russian defense plants, uncovering the billion-dollar supply chain behind Russia’s weapons-making industry.

This hidden trade is not abstract, it directly feeds Russia’s most sensitive defense programs. One of the clearest examples is found in the country’s nuclear engineering sector.

Sanctioned Japanese CNC technology  reaches Russia’s nuclear industry

OKBM Afrikantov, one of Russia’s leading nuclear engineering firms, produces, among other things, nuclear engines for the country’s atomic fleet. Like much of Russia’s defense industry, the enterprise remains heavily reliant on Western technologies and manufacturing equipment now banned from import under international sanctions. Chief among these are CNC metalworking machines.

Despite the restrictions, in July 2025 the company received a commercial offer from Pumori-Engineering Invest—Russian engineering and machine-tool company. The document stated:

“LLC Pumori-Engineering Invest offers you for consideration a preliminary technical and commercial proposal for the supply of equipment: CNC lathe, model LT400M, US Wheeler (PRC), for OKBM Afrikantov.”

The CNC system in this machine was produced by FANUC, a Japanese company that is a world leader in the field.

The cost of two machines was listed at 3,355,200 Chinese yuan ($470,000). Production time was set at seven months, with delivery requiring an additional 40–60 days. The proposal contained a telling note:

“In view of the sanctions policy of unfriendly countries and export restrictions concerning metalworking equipment, the information contained in this document is strictly confidential and intended only for the recipient(s). Forwarding this document to third parties is prohibited.”

Moreover, the seller emphasized that in the event of a signed contract, Pumori-Engineering Invest reserved the right to change the equipment’s name in the contract to minimize export risks.

The backdoor supply chain from China to Moscow

Pumori-Engineering Invest is part of the Pumori Corporation, an engineering and machine-tool holding company specializing in integrated solutions for machine-building enterprises. Formally, the company reports billions of rubles in revenue, but in practice, it imports sanctioned products prohibited for delivery to Russia.

Open sources identify Aleksandr Ivanovich Balandin as the company’s founder and director.

UNITED24 Media reached out to Chinese high-tech manufacturer US Wheeler, whose equipment Pumori imports for resale to the defense sector. The company responded that it was “unaware that its products were reaching Russian defense enterprises” and that exports to Russia had been halted “since the beginning of the war.” However, this statement raises doubts: Pumori’s commercial offer specified production lead times for the lathe, suggesting direct contacts with the manufacturer.

FANUC, whose CNC systems are integrated into Chinese machines, also denied any ties with Russia:

“In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, our company has banned new transactions for all products destined for Russia since March 2022. This policy has been communicated to our overseas affiliates.”

At the same time, FANUC declined to confirm whether it supplies CNC systems to the Chinese manufacturer. The company said only that if evidence of deliveries to Russia were confirmed, it would “terminate cooperation with the relevant partner.”

UNITED24 Media journalists also identified a range of Japanese components in products supplied by Pumori-Engineering Invest to defense enterprises:

Even a surface-level analysis of open sources shows that international sanctions and corporate compliance rules are insufficient to halt the flow of banned products into Russia.

During the “Metalworking-2025” exhibition in Moscow, our editorial team documented the open sale of machines equipped with FANUC components.

Despite sanctions, Russian defense enterprises continue to acquire the equipment they need from countries that remain Russia's trade partners. This is not an isolated case but part of a large-scale process involving tens of thousands of banned product items—amounting to billions of dollars.

Sanctions without robust monitoring, enforcement, and accountability mechanisms cannot fully prevent the flow of banned equipment into Moscow’s military-industrial complex.