Will the New Trump Administration End Escalation Management That Has Arguably Prolonged the War in Ukraine?

In the fall of 2022, Ukraine was riding a wave of optimism. The successful Kherson and Kharkiv offensives brought fresh energy to the country as Ukrainians celebrated major victories—outmaneuvering the enemy and liberating approximately 75,000 square kilometers of territory. 

President Zelenskyy sought to capitalize on this momentum, urgently requesting critical weapons to push forward and secure a decisive victory. However, Western allies, particularly the US, hesitated, delaying the delivery of essential arms over concerns of provoking Russian escalation.

By 2023, Ukraine made clear its need for F-16 fighter jets, ATACMS missiles, Leopard 2 tanks, 155mm artillery rounds, and advanced air defense systems. Meanwhile, Russia regrouped, digging in along highly fortified defense lines like the Surovikin Line in anticipation of further counterattacks. 

Although some systems, such as Leopard 2 tanks and HIMARS, eventually arrived, the prolonged delays in providing long-range missiles and fighter jets were emblematic to many experts as a broader failure of escalation management. 

We stand with Ukraine as long as it takes

In the context of Ukraine, escalation management has manifested as the West’s hesitancy to provide advanced weaponry or take more decisive measures out of fear that such actions might trigger a larger conflict with Russia, potentially involving NATO or even nuclear escalation.

According to the Ukrainian president himself, this hesitation denied Ukraine the tools needed to sustain its momentum and exploit opportunities for a decisive victory. In an interview with CNN, he said:

"I wanted our counteroffensive to happen much earlier because everyone understood that if the counteroffensive unfolds later, then a bigger part of our territory will be mined. We give our enemy the time and possibility to place more mines and prepare their defensive lines.."

The delay in providing essential military support had immediate and devastating consequences. By the summer of 2023, as Ukraine launched its long-anticipated counteroffensive, Russian defenses were entrenched, and the window for decisive action had closed. 

Ukrainian forces struggled to make significant progress, losing much of the momentum from 2022. The counteroffensive in southern Ukraine failed to achieve the breakthroughs needed to shift the balance of the war. 

The West’s hesitancy to deliver decisive weaponry—particularly long-range missiles and fighter jets—meant that Ukraine was forced to fight without the tools it needed to secure a faster victory when such an outcome was still within reach.

Loss of momentum

Following the summer 2023 counteroffensive, Ukraine experienced a stark shift in its military posture. Months of deliberation in the US Congress—led by opposition from prominent Republican voices—exacerbated the situation, delaying the approval of critical funding and further hindering Ukraine’s efforts.

By the end of 2023, Ukraine had adopted a defensive stance, focusing on holding recaptured territories and fortifying positions against Russian advances. The territorial gains were starkly contrasted: Approximately 75,000 square kilometers were liberated in 2022, compared to just 370 square kilometers in 2023 and 1,000 square kilometers in 2024.

The failures of escalation management left Ukraine fighting an uphill battle against entrenched Russian forces and the wavering political will of its NATO-aligned partners. This challenge echoes historical patterns of cautious Western responses during pivotal moments in Ukraine's history.

Chicken Kyiv speech (1991)

In a speech delivered in Kyiv just three weeks before Ukraine declared independence, US President George H.W. Bush warned against "suicidal nationalism" and urged Ukrainians to settle for autonomy within the Soviet Union instead of full independence. 

The leader of the most powerful country in the world made his message clear: stay within Moscow’s orbit to avoid destabilization and the “balkanization” of the region.

Dubbed the "Chicken Kyiv Speech" a play on words, combining the name of the popular Ukrainian dish "Chicken Kyiv" with the suggestion that Bush’s stance was "chicken". 

it’s remembered as an early example of the West’s unwillingness to back Ukraine’s sovereignty. It wasn’t about supporting freedom—it was about not upsetting Moscow. This reluctance to confront Russian aggression head-on has become a recurring theme, leaving Ukraine exposed time and time again.

Budapest Memorandum (1994)

Ukraine agreed to surrender the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal, inherited from the Soviet Union, in exchange for promises of protection from major powers—the US, the U.K., and Russia. 

According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, this arsenal included nearly 1,900 strategic warheads, 176 intercontinental ballistic missiles (130 SS-19s and 46 SS-24s), and 44 strategic bombers, alongside 2,650 to 4,200 tactical nuclear weapons.

The Budapest Memorandum, signed in 1994, pledged to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. However, these were "assurances" rather than "guarantees"—a minor difference but proved critical. 

Unlike guarantees, which carry binding commitments to NATO’s Article 5, assurances imposed no legal obligation for intervention. This left Ukraine exposed when Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, and even more so during the 2022 full-scale invasion, violating the very promises or assurances meant to safeguard its sovereignty. 

The Bucharest Summit and invasion of Georgia (2008)

At the Bucharest Summit, NATO leaders declared that Ukraine and Georgia "will become members of NATO." Still, they stopped short of offering a Membership Action Plan (MAP), a critical step toward accession.

“You don’t understand, George, that Ukraine is not even a state. What is Ukraine? Part of its territories is Eastern Europe, but the greater part is a gift from us,” said Russian leader Vladimir Putin.

Russia strongly opposed any move to bring Ukraine and Georgia closer to NATO. Putin, who was courteously invited to the summit, openly expressed his opposition, viewing NATO expansion as a direct threat to Russia’s security and sphere of influence.

A few months after the NATO Summit, Russia invaded its neighbor Georgia in August 2008, targeting South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Framed as a peacekeeping mission, the invasion was calculated to demonstrate that Russia could act with impunity in its sphere of influence, confident that NATO would avoid confrontation.

Crimea and Donbas (2014 onward)

Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its orchestrated war in the Donbas marked a dramatic escalation in its aggression toward Ukraine. In Crimea, Russian forces swiftly occupied the peninsula, followed by a sham referendum that claimed overwhelming support for joining Russia.

The international response was limited to sanctions and diplomatic condemnation, with no military action to counter the invasion. The lack of consequences for the Russians effectively legitimized their 21st-century land grab and became a precedent for future aggression.

In the Donbas, Moscow fueled a war by supporting separatist movements in Donetsk and Luhansk, supplying weapons, fighters, and political backing.

What began as covert support quickly escalated into direct Russian military intervention. By 2015, the Minsk Agreements were brokered to establish a ceasefire, but their implementation stalled as Russia used the agreements to cement its influence in the region.

The annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas left Ukraine fighting to reclaim its sovereignty while the West struggled to address Russian aggression without risking escalation or jeopardizing its reliance on Russian energy.

Steinmeier’s formula (2019)

In 2019, German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier proposed a formula to address the war in Ukraine. It called for local elections in Russian-occupied Donetsk and Luhansk, with the regions gaining special autonomy if the elections were deemed free and fair.

However, many Ukrainians saw the proposal as dangerous, fearing it would legitimize Russia’s control over the Donbas and nullify everything Ukraine was fighting to liberate. Critics argued that holding elections under occupation, without first restoring Ukrainian control over the borders, would solidify Kremlin influence in the region. 

Protests erupted across Ukraine under the slogan “No to Capitulation!” as opponents warned the plan risked rewarding Russia’s aggression and undermining Ukraine’s sovereignty. For many, Steinmeier’s Formula symbolized a Western preference for de-escalation at any cost—even if it came at the expense of Ukraine’s territorial integrity.

New administrations new beginnings

Ukraine has made significant concessions in its efforts to remain diplomatically aligned with the West, many experts argue that escalation management policies, while intended to avoid broader conflict, have inadvertently stripped Ukraine of its momentum and steered it toward the negotiating table with Russia—some might even say intentionally. 

At the same time, it is undeniable that Russia finds itself in a weakened position. The coordinated efforts of Western nations, combined with Ukraine’s fierce and determined resistance, have inflicted substantial economic, military, and geopolitical damage on Moscow. 

This presents a unique moment in history—an opportunity to deliver a decisive blow to Russia’s ambitions and prevent future aggression. The question now is whether the next administration will capitalize on this moment or follow the same cautious strategies that have often left Russia unchecked. 

As history has shown, allowing Russia to regroup and fester unabated typically leads to renewed aggression and greater instability—a cycle the world can ill afford to repeat. These next few years will define the global balance of power for the years to come.