Components from American and Western Companies Are in Every Russian Missile

On the morning of July 8, a Russian missile struck Ukraine's largest children's hospital, Ohmatdyt. Two adults died on the spot, followed later by one more child. Dozens were injured. The hospital, which annually performed 9,000 surgeries, was partially destroyed, along with equipment that was worth tens of millions of dollars.

All evidence confirms that Russia used a Kh-101 missile for the strike. It hit one of the hospital buildings, demolishing everything around it. In Kh-101 missile there are more than 50 electronic components, 73% of which are from American companies.

Russia is far from being self-sufficient in its arms manufacturing. Russian defense industry relies heavily on imported components, including those produced in the West and smuggled to Russia using grey schemes.

Foreign components, particularly from Western companies, are present in all the missiles used by Russia: Kh-101, Kinzhal, Kalibr, Iskander, Tsirkon, and Kh-59. This involves dozens of companies from the USA, Switzerland, Germany, Japan, and other countries, whose electronics Russia uses to create missiles.

The Yermak-McFaul group analyzed information regarding Western components in Russian missiles and prepared a detailed report on this. Among the companies whose components are most frequently used are Intel, Texas Instruments, Cypress Semiconductor, STMicroelectronics, Motorola, and others.

Iskander / 15 foreign components

Iskander / 32 foreign components

Kh-101 / 53 foreign components

Kalibr / 44 foreign components

It is rather natural that the share of American companies is so large, because the U.S. is the largest manufacturer of electronics in the world. Still, neither of the facts change the reality of so many Western components ending up in Russian tools of terror killing people in Ukraine

The most popular UAV used by Russia for attacks on Ukraine, the Shahed, is no exception. The Iranian design uses more than 55-120 foreign components, including electronics from the US, Germany, Switzerland, Japan, Canada, the Netherlands, Austria, Armenia, the Republic of Korea, and others.

Since 2022, Russia has launched over 5,000 Shahed UAVs at Ukraine.

What can be done about this? 

Ukraine's partners have already imposed restrictions on the supply of electronics and dual-use goods to Russia. 

However, Russia has found a workaround, using intermediaries and murky schemes in various countries, from Russia’s neighbors to the Middle East, Asia, and elsewhere, where dozens of “front” companies are created. 

Potential actions include more active monitoring of potential clients for such goods sales, including clients of companies’ distributors, even if their production facilities are not in the sanctions coalition countries. Secondary sanctions against legal entities, companies, banks, or even countries selling electronics to Russia should be imposed.

We are not saying that Western governments deliberately supply components for Russian weapons. Rather, this is a matter of Russian companies finding ways to circumvent export controls faster than the Western governments and companies identify and combat those schemes. We are certain that the West has the best financial intelligence and all the capabilities to crack down on Russia’s smuggling of components with the aim of slaughtering civilians in Ukraine. 

Western companies Should be obligated to track their end consumers to avoid becoming, even if unknowingly, accomplices to Russia’s genocidal war against Ukraine.

It’s not enough to simply impose sanctions and export limitations. They must also be thoroughly enforced. Loopholes must be closed. Decisions must be followed by actions. With sufficient resolve, we will be able to deprive Russia’s war machine of access to Western technology and limit its ability to manufacture tools of terror and commit atrocities”.