Belarus Remains Russia’s Launchpad for Strikes Across Europe

On September 10, Russian Shahed drones attacked Poland: up to 23 were counted, flying deep into the country, hundreds of kilometers from the border. Despite attempts to pass this off as an accident, the Russian side is not trusted: EU and NATO officials are convinced this was a deliberate provocation.

Warnings of such incidents began as soon as Russia and Belarus officially announced the Zapad-2025 drills, which raised the prospect of provocations against states bordering Belarus.

And while Moscow has been singled out as responsible for the drone attacks, it should not be forgotten that at least two drones crossed into Poland via the Belarusian border. This is precisely how Belarus should be viewed—as Russia’s ally.

A Kremlin proxy

While Lukashenko tries to present himself to Americans as a negotiator, Ukraine clearly remembers that Minsk is the Kremlin’s closest ally.

In February 2022, tens of thousands of Russian troops and thousands of pieces of military equipment crossed Ukraine’s northern border from Belarusian territory. In other words, Lukashenko allowed the Russian army to launch its invasion from his land.

The attack had been prepared well in advance. In 2021, up to 200,000 Russian troops entered Belarus for the joint Zapad-2021 drills. Soon after, in early 2022, another joint exercise, Union Resolve 2022, was held from February 10 to 20—just four days before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Belarus was a full participant in the start of the war.

Later, Belarus hosted training bases for future Russian soldiers, while its weapons stockpiles and equipment became a supply source for Russia’s army.

And as Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Belarus has removed its constitutional prohibition on hosting nuclear weapons.

Then, Putin and Lukashenko jointly violated the nuclear nonproliferation treaty: in 2023, Russia began transferring nuclear weapons to Belarus, along with delivery systems capable of launching nuclear warheads (e.g. Iskander-M). In subsequent interviews, Lukashenko insisted that such a launch could only happen with his personal authorization. But given that just two years earlier, Russian forces invaded Ukraine from Belarusian soil, such authorization seems hardly out of reach.

This is not speculation but a firm conclusion drawn from Ukraine’s observations over the past three years. Shahed drones have repeatedly entered Ukrainian airspace from the north—through Belarus. Every time there is a mass strike, a percentage of the drones fly from Belarus toward Chernihiv, Kyiv, and other cities, destroying infrastructure and civilian housing. Belarus’s air defenses are conspicuously inactive during such attacks.

A threat to Europe

Moscow’s September 10 strike—with Polish airports shut down and Russian drones were shot down over NATO territory—showed how easily Russia can extend its attacks beyond Ukraine’s borders. Several drones reportedly crossed in from Belarus.

With Shaheds capable of ranges up to 2,500 kilometers in their standard form, virtually every European capital within that radius—from Warsaw and Berlin to Rome—falls within potential reach. Even the shorter-range, heavier variants can still hit deep into Poland or the Baltics with Belarus as a potential launchpad. This way, the strike radius stretches even deeper into Europe.

Lukashenko likes to present himself as a peacemaker. The Shahed strike on Poland is a telling example: Minsk claimed its air defenses tried to shoot down drones heading toward Polish territory. No proof was provided. Instead, there is another pattern: Belarus is deliberately destabilizing its border with Poland by orchestrating migrant incursions. Only the active measures of Polish border guards have prevented a crisis—they respond not with expressions of concern but with force, which is exactly what defending one’s territory requires.

Belarus has effectively become Russia’s launchpad for hybrid warfare against European countries. Its shared borders with Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia leave such options wide open. The so-called Suwałki Corridor—the strip of land between Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave and Belarus—underscores this reality. The region is widely seen as one of Europe’s most potentially unstable flashpoints and could quickly become a threat to Poland and the Baltic states.

Ukraine has already provided the clearest example: Russia views Minsk as its accomplice and is ready to use Belarus to pursue its own expansionist goals. The fact that Zapad drills are held there is further proof—Russian troops have already launched offensives from Belarus once, and they can do it again, if needed.

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