- Category
- Investigations
Chinese “Smart Sex Toy” Company Shipped Microelectronics and Motors to Russia and Iran
Prefer U24 Media on Google
- Authors
![Photo of Roman Kohanets]( "Photo of Roman Kohanets")
-111f0e5095e02c02446ffed57bfb0ab1.jpeg "Photo of Roman Kohanets")
NAKO, an independent Ukrainian anti-corruption body, has traced Russian microelectronics suppliers operating from Hong Kong offices to the same premises used by a network accused of arming Iran's ballistic-missile and drone programs.
We bring you stories from the ground. Your support keeps our team in the field.
The finding comes from a NAKO study of roughly 1,800 foreign suppliers involved in more than $800 million worth of trade in priority Western microelectronics.
The analysis opened with a question its authors wrote they hear repeatedly in efforts to close gaps in the sanctions regime: "It takes years to sanction something that can be replicated in days—so what is the point of sanctions at all?"
-180a5b79f7118ec62330bb466f81486d.jpg)
The Iranian thread
The central case involves Liu Baoxia, a Chinese national also known as Emily Liu. The United States sanctioned her in 2017, and the FBI added her and her accomplices to its wanted list in 2025, according to NAKO.
Since 2007, her network has allegedly smuggled US-origin electronic components to Iran in support of its ballistic-missile and UAV programs.
That network relied on Hong Kong front companies established by corporate secretaries working from the Ho King Commercial Center, the report noted. NAKO identified at least 14 companies supplying microelectronics to Russia from those same offices, only five of which have been sanctioned.
The commission stressed that a shared address does not prove that its tenants form a single coordinated network. It does, NAKO argued, signal a heightened risk of diversion that entity-based screening routinely misses.
Hidden in plain sight
Other suppliers are hiding in plain sight. The study found that Shenzhen NuanQin Technology, which was advertised as a maker of “smart sex toys,” did not ship any to Russia. Instead, customs records showed integrated circuits and over $100,000 worth of electric motors. There were also links to a drone retailer and a copier cartridge recycler.
At a single Hong Kong office unit, NAKO counted at least 45 companies. Fourteen were already under sanctions or export controls; 31 were not. Together, they supplied Russia with more than $16 million in priority microelectronics.
Firms registered at addresses tied to offshore structures accounted for a further $57 million in supplies, the commission documented. Of that, $26 million came from entities facing no restrictions at all.
Why addresses matter
In total, the study identified more than 200 addresses associated with sanctioned or export-controlled entities. Over 450 suppliers used them, accounting for nearly $380 million in trade.
NAKO observed that the US Bureau of Industry and Security has, since 2024, begun adding high-risk addresses rather than only named companies to its Entity List. The commission urged the United States, European Union, Japan, and the United Kingdom to build a shared list of high-risk locations, warning that address-based screening remains widely overlooked, particularly across the EU.
Hong Kong's role as a permissive waypoint extends well beyond microchips.
Neither Hong Kong nor mainland China restricts the trade that Western sanctions target, leaving the territory a convenient clearing point for goods Moscow cannot easily source elsewhere.
Russian gold imports to Hong Kong reached nearly 100 tonnes in the first seven months of 2026, almost triple the volume a year earlier, as bullion barred from London and New York found a willing market there.
The same accommodating infrastructure that channels precious metals eastward appears to shelter the chip suppliers that keep Russian weapons plants running.
Discuss this article:
-9a7b3a98ed5c506e0b77a6663f5727c5.png)
-180a5b79f7118ec62330bb466f81486d.jpg "Russia’s Pole-21 Jams Ukrainian Weapons, But Still Gets Tech From Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea")
-746b4b2b462bcc32d9fe98e546a988c4.jpg "Photo of Roman Steblivskyi")
-d0639f8f32c5f2475af526d3a81d5b77.png "How Russian Propaganda Learned to Look Finnish")
-46f6afa2f66d31ff3df8ea1a8f5524ec.jpg "Photo of Jess Daly")
-605be766de04ba3d21b67fb76a76786a.jpg "Joseph Place")