Russia Is Sending Its Wounded Soldiers Into Meat Grinder Assaults, Even on Crutches

While shocking, this practice is no longer an exception—it has become routine in the Russian military. Sending injured soldiers back to the front is not just a symptom of an overburdened medical system or a disregard for human life. It is now an institutionalized strategy to sustain Russia’s offensive operations despite catastrophic losses. 

Reports from multiple sources—including Russian military bloggers, Western intelligence, and Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence—point to a pattern in which wounded soldiers are not treated but repurposed.

Legislative roots

At the end of 2023, the Russian Defense Ministry put forward a proposal to modify the medical screening process for army recruitment, according to Important Stories, an independent Russian media outlet. The proposal aimed to adjust the criteria based on the "experience of the military operation," suggesting that certain medical conditions deemed to have minimal impact on a soldier's ability to serve could be removed from lists disqualifying the said soldier from being a soldier.

Shortly after a trend began to emerge within the Russian military. Soldiers with severe war-related injuries were increasingly being classified as fit for duty. 

Some units have even formed so-called "disabled" regiments composed of troops who, under normal circumstances, would not be considered capable of combat. Many wounded soldiers, instead of receiving proper medical treatment, are sent to convalescent regiments before being reassigned to front-line assault units without undergoing a proper military medical commission or receiving qualified care.

The strategic aspect

On October 28, 2024, Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence (HUR) reported that Russian commanders near Lyman, Donetsk region, ordered even lightly wounded soldiers back into combat after suffering significant casualties.

HUR stated that these soldiers are being sent into ‘meat assaults,’ a term used to describe high-casualty frontal attacks meant to wear down Ukrainian defenses through sheer numbers.

Many of these troops, already weakened, have complained about their lack of proper fortifications against Ukrainian drone and artillery strikes. Some have refused orders outright, recognizing the near-certain fatality of their deployments.

Coercion and bribery

The US-based think tank Institute for the Study of War (ISW) has documented cases where injured Russian soldiers are being detained in "medical basements," forced to either pay bribes for release or return to combat.

On October 31, 2024, ISW detailed an incident involving the 57th Motorized Rifle Regiment, where wounded personnel were reportedly held hostage until they could pay bribes of 1.5 million rubles ($15,459). Those who could not afford it were sent directly back to the front.

A former Storm-Z instructor and Russian mil blogger, Slava Nork, described how soldiers were deployed not because they had recovered but because their units were critically understaffed.

“We don't have enough people, you won't go anywhere," Nork quoted the explanation given to the Russian wounded soldiers.

ISW also reported that similar tactics were being used in other regiments, including the 109th Rifle Regiment. The pattern suggests that Russian commanders are resorting to increasingly coercive measures to fill gaps in depleted frontline units.

This practice aligns with the Russian Ministry of Defense’s November 2023 proposal to revise medical fitness criteria for soldiers. The proposal sought to remove certain injuries and illnesses from the list of conditions that would disqualify soldiers from service. 

While the ministry did not release the full details, reports indicate that even those with nerve damage, missing teeth, or untreated shrapnel wounds are being declared fit for combat.

Losses and recruitment challenges

With battlefield losses continuing to climb, Russia’s ability to sustain its military operations has come under question. Efforts to replace lost soldiers—through forced mobilization, recruitment from prisons, and coercion—have not kept pace with casualties.

Reports suggest that commanders are increasingly relying on wounded soldiers because they have few other options. The use of injured soldiers in active combat raises concerns about long-term effectiveness, unit cohesion, and morale. 

Experts have pointed to evidence of Russian troops refusing to fight or expressing frustration over repeated deployments despite their physical condition.

Despite these challenges, the practice appears to be expanding. The reliance on soldiers deemed unfit for duty suggests that Russia’s high command is prioritizing immediate battlefield numbers over long-term combat sustainability.

The decision to send wounded soldiers back into combat is not an isolated policy but part of a broader effort to maintain offensive operations despite significant losses. Intelligence reports and open-source data all indicate that the Russian military is systematically redeploying injured personnel.

Whether this strategy will allow Russia to sustain its offensives or lead to further strain on its forces remains uncertain. 

However, reports of low morale, battlefield refusals, and logistical challenges indicate that this policy is adding further strain to an already overextended force. For many Russian soldiers, being wounded does not mean leaving the battlefield—it only marks the start of another deployment.